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proceeds as projected by the Bulwinkle Bill 41 and the Interstate
Commerce Commission itself, there is no need of any injunctive action by the Supreme Court or any further concern by bodies
other
42
than Congress and the Interstate Commerce Commission.
6. The pyramiding of regulatory controls and duplication of
investigations is poor administration and worse economy. Consideration should be given to enlargement of control of the Interstate
Commerce Commission over monopolistic practices in rate promulgation, removing this matter from the sphere of the Sherman AntiTrust Act.
7. Finally, reduction of political pressure on the Interstate
Commerce Commission by politicians and other pressure groups is
desirable so that it will be able to continue to do the excellent work
it has done in the past toward the goal of a soundly administered
transportation system.
SEYMOUR LAUNER,
WILLIAM F. McGINN.

THE INTERNATIONAL

WAR CRIMINAL TRIALS AND THE COMMON

LAW OF WAR

One of the most significant events in human history is at present
taking place in Nuernberg, Germany. Here, for the first time, the
nations of the earth have united to take legal action against those
individuals who, it is alleged, have broken the most primary rules
and laws of human society. At Nuernberg for the first time, the
nations of this planet are applying internationally those principles of
law enforcement which for centuries have been applied on a national
scale. But just as every forward step in human progress has been
met with opposition, so the international war criminal trials at
Nuernberg have met with opposition.
The most frequent criticism hurled at these trials is that they
are applying newly created law and that this type of procedure is
without legal basis or precedent. Carrying on from there, these

1 H.R. 2536-To meet the criticism of the private nature of these rate

bureaus the Bulwinkle Bill provides for adequate regulation by the Interstate
Commerce Commission of the publishing of rates. The House Commerce
Committee has recommended also that the Interstate Commerce Commission
be given authorization to require reports from and inspection of the records
of rate bureaus.
42A. H. Feller, Administrative Justice, 27 Survey Graphic 494, "No one
asks the court to relax its vigilance over administrative agencies; but it must
proceed with caution, to intervene only where essential rights are transgressed,
and not permit general principles to impede effective enforcement of the law."
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critics arrive at the conclusion that ex post facto law is being applied
in contravention of the recognized principles of law as evolved
through centuries of legal and human experience. This contention
is very far indeed from the truth. As a matter of fact, the law being
applied at Nuernberg is not newly created, but has its roots in the
very beginnings of human social organization.
The common law of war had its inception in antiquity. The
sea lanes of the ancient world were beset by many pirates, and dealing with these pirates, who owed allegiance to no nation, became a
matter of international concern.' After the end of the Roman
Empire, and with the advent of Feudalism, the development of the
principles of the common law of war became dormant, for in this
turbulent period there were no national states which could enunciate
and enforce any form of law. The practices of war in this period
were entirely brutal and without restraint.2 But with the decline of
Feudalism and the recrudescence of the national state, once again
western civilization was faced with the problem of dealing with the
international pirates who preyed upon the peaceful trade of the world
and committed excesses which even then were recognized as contravening the laws of war. These brigands did not confine themselves to the sea lanes of the world, but also operated on land, especially in the mountainous areas of Europe, near the international
boundaries. The terrain particularly lent itself to the operations of
these international criminals for by constantly crossing and recrossing
the national boundaries, the criminals could avoid pursuit and
'capture.3
From these obscure beginnings there began to develop a set of
rules which were recognized throughout the civilized world and were
applied by the nations of the world. A pirate when caught after a
battle with the military forces of a nation, would never be afforded
the immunities granted to the captured members of a recognized national military force. 4 This body of rules had so grown by the 16th
century that Balthazar Ayala (1548-84) was able to recommend
that, "the Pope be recognized as supreme judge for instances where
sovereigns violated the law of nations or resorted to indefensible
cruelties in the conduct of their perhaps initially lawful military
campaigns."
The common law of war continued to develop and be applied
in the national courts of the world, gaining more and more certainty
and clarity with the passage of years. In this country, we had many

I Cowles,

Universality of Jurisdictiio Over War Crimes (1945)

L. REv.
176.
2

33 CALiF.

Garner, Laws of Warfare (1935) 15 Excyc. Soc. ScIlm cs 359.
33 CAur. L. RnV. 176,- cited supra note 1.
4Ibid.
at 188.
5
Levy, Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and International Law

(1945)

12 U. or Cui. L. Rnv. 313.
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occasions to use this common law of war. As a result of the Modoc
Indian War of 1873, a prisoner of war was tried and convicted before a military commission for having killed a bearer of a flag of
truce; in upholding this action, the Attorney General of the United
States said, "military commissions are competent to try for offences
against the recognized laws of war and to subject those found guilty
to such punishment as those laws require or justify." 6
Attorney General Speed, when asked for an opinion on the
competency of a military tribunal to try offenses against the common
law of war, wrote, "No one who has ever glanced at the many
treatises that have been published in different ages of the world by
great, good and learned men, can fail to know that the laws of war
constitute a part of the law of nations and that those laws have been
prescribed with tolerable accuracy." 7
These rules and conventions of war were again enunciated and
recognized by the Hague Conventions of 1899, 1907, and the Geneva
Convention of 1929. They were also declared by Article 228 of the
Treaty of Versailles in which the German Government recognized
the right of the Allies, "to bring before international military tribunals, persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the
laws and customs of war." 8
Preparatory to writing that treaty, the Allies set up a commission t6 determine the law as to the punishment of war criminals and
to submit their findings together with their recommendations as to
the procedure best suited to punish these offenders. The majority
of the commission recommended an international court which would
apply "the principles of the law of nations as they result from the
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity
and from the dictates of public conscience." 9
The attempted punishment of the war criminals of World War I
resulted in a dismal failure, for although Germany had agreed to
surrender all persons requested by the Allies, she refused to do so,
when a list of names was presented to her. After much diplomatic
maneuvering, Germany was finally allowed to try her own war criminals. Of an original list of approximately 700 persons accused of
serious offenses, only twelve were actually tried and six convicted.
The sentences were inadequate and the two whose sentences were
most severe soon escaped from jail, apparently with official approval.' 0
In one of the trials at Leipzig, the German Supreme Court in
the case involving the torpedoing of the British hospital ship, Llandovery Castle, said, "any violation of the law of nations in warfare
6 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 249.
7

11 Ops. Atty. Gen. 290.

8 Treaty of Peace With Germany (1919) 13 Am. 3.

INT. L. 151, 250.
9 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
the Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace
Conference, March 29, 1919 (1920) 14 Am. J.INT. L. 95, 146.
loGlueck, Trial and Punishment of Axis War Criminals (1942) 4 FEE
WoRLD 138; also see GLUECr, WAR CRimINALs-THEIR PROSECUTION AND
PUNISHMENT (1944).
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is .. .a punishable offence so far as in general a penalty is attached
to the deed. . . .The fact that his deed is a violation of international law must be well known to the doer. . . .The rule of international law, which is here involved is simple and is universally
known." 1

Thus it can readily be seen that the substantive provision of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal 12 is the logical culmination of centuries of legal decisions and social thought. The law
being applied at Nuernberg is as old and well established as English
common law. Furthermore, ex post facto law is not being used; the
crimes for which the twenty defendants are being tried have been
penalized by the courts of the world for centuries.
11 Germany v. Dithmar and Boldt, Leipzig: (1921)

708, 721.
12

16 AM. J. INT. L. 674,

Charter of The International Military Tribunal (1945)

31 A. B. A. J.

454:

Art. 6: The following acts or any of them are crimes coming within

the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility.
A. Crimes against peace. Namely planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements or assurances or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the foregoing.
B. War Crimes. Namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose, of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property,
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation
not justified by military necessity.
C. Crimes against humanity. Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such a
plan.
Art. 7: The official position of defendants, whether as heads of state or
responsible officials in Government departments, shall not be
considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment.
Art. 8: The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government, or of a superior, shall not free him from responsibility,
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal
determines that justice so requires.
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The next criticism which is leveled at the Nuernberg trials is
directed at Article 8 '3 of the Charter. It is said by many international lawyers that this provision is in direct contravention to the
established law. The doctrine of respondeat superior, or the defense
of superior order, is an entirely outmoded principle and while there
is some authority for this doctrine, there is greater authority in favor
of disregarding this troublesome concept. It has always been held
in this country that stare decisis is fully sensitive to social, economic
and political evolution or change, 14 and in the face of conflicting precedents judicial choice is permitted. 15 Therefore, faced with conflicting
precedents and with a pressing social need, the victorious powers had
a choice of doctrines and they discarded respondeat superior.
The German court at Leipzig made the following striking statement, "The killing of enemies in war is in accordance with the will
of the state that makes war . . . only in so far as such killings are
in accordance with the conditions and limitations imposed by the law
of nations." 16

The German Military Penal Code says, "A subordinate who
acts in conformity with orders is liable to punishment as an accomplice, when he knows that the ordered acts involve a military or
civil crime or misdemeanor, without regard to whether it was dangerous for him to disobey." 17
In the Anglo-American common law, which does not recognize
responsibility of the government for torts of its officers, the superior
order is not a justification and the officer who executed an unlawful
order is liable to the injured. If he had to pay damages to the injured,
he could in a proper case be indemnified, ex-gratia by the
government.'I
Another principle of the international common law of war with
conflicting precedents, is that of the immunity of the head of a state.
This defense has been specifically ruled out by Article 7 '" of the
International Military Tribunal's Charter. Thus we now have as a
recognized principle the essence of the classic remark of Sir Edward
Coke when he reminded James I that the medieval doctrine of the
supremacy of the law took precedence over the divine right of monarchy by quoting to him the words of Bracton, "The king is subject
not to men, but to God and Law." 20
See note 12 supra.
Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q.
165; Kocurek and Koven, Renovation of the Common Law Through Stare
Decisis (1935) 29 Ii.. L. REv. 971.
15 Wurzler v. Clifford, - Misc. -, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 516 (1942).
16 Germany v. Dithmar and Boldt, cited supra note 11.
17 Sack, War Criminalsand the Defense of Superior Order in International
Law (1945) 5 L. G. REP. 11.
2s 5 L. G. REP 11, cited supra note 17.
19 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, cited supra note 12.
20 Sprecher, The Development of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which
it Should Be Applied (1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 501.
13
14
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After the last war, Germany conceded the right of the Allies to
try the Kaiser for war crimes, 2 and merely the refusal of Holland,
a neutral country, to surrender him, saved the monarch. In World
War I, the commission 2 2 was of the opinion, "that in the hierarchy
of persons in authority, there is no reason why rank, however exalted,
should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from responsibility when that responsibility has been established before a properly
constituted tribunal. All persons belonging to enemy countries,
however high their position may have been, without distinction of
rank, including chiefs of state, who have been guilty of offenses against
the law and customs of war or the laws of humanity are liable to
criminal prosecution." Here again the great powers of the world
when faced with conflicting doctrines made a choice in light of the
existing sociological facts.
Another favorite legalistic argument which is directed against
the Tribunal is the doctrine of Nuld Poema Sine Lege (No Penalty
Without Law). "But it doesn't follow from this that in the absence
of domestic legislation an international court cannot justifiably punish
acts well known by all concerned to be contrary to the law of nations. Direct application of international law to individuals who have
violated the laws and customs of war does not amount to giving law
retroactive force." 28 This is borne out by our own legal history. For
when Henry Wirz pleaded before a military commission established
in 1865 that it had no jurisdiction since it was not authorized by
statute, the plea was overruled and he was convicted and hanged for
murder in violation of the laws and customs of war." 24
Then also criticism might be leveled at the fact that the court
which is now trying the twenty defendants had no jurisdiction at the
time the crimes were committed since it was not in existence. But
this is not a fatal defect for it is conceded that the military tribunals
have always been able to take cognizance of offenses committed during the war
before the initiation of the military government or mar25
tial law.
There seems to be one legal factor about international law which
is constantly being ignored, namely that international law is permissive rather than a restrictive body of rules. That is to say, "that

Treaty of Versailles, Art. 227 (1921) 14 Am. J. INT. L. 116.
Commission Report, cited supra note 9.
23
Glueck, By What Tribuuna Shalt War Offenders Be Tried (1943)
HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1081.
24 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 249.
21
22

25

J. A. G. 1912, 1067 (1-C-8a) (3) (b) (2).
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international law confines the jurisdiction of sovereignties and those
rights which are not specifically ruled out accrue to the nations of
the world as a residue of power." 26
The Permanent Court of International Justice said in 1927,27
"International law governs relations between independent States.
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their
own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to
regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed. All that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction."
Immediately after the trials at Nuernberg had opened, the defense counsel argued that the defendants were not being given a fair
trial because only the victorious powers were represented on the
Tribunal. This is hardly a valid argument, for as a result of their
activities in the prosecution of the war criminals of World War I,
the German people have shown themselves to be utterly unreliable
when it comes to administering this type of justice.
President Wilson, 28 when considering the formation of an international tribunal similar to the one now functioning at Nuernberg,
was asked about German participation and he made the following
statement:
As regards the German contention that a trial of the accused by tribunals
appointed by the Allied and Associated Powers would be a one-sided and inequitable proceeding, the Allied and Associated Powers consider that it is
impossible to entrust the trial of those directly responsible for offences against

humanity and international right, to their accomplices in their crimes. Almost
the whole world has banded itself together in order to bring to naught the
German plan of conquest and dominion. The tribunals they will establish will

therefore represent the deliberate judgment of the greater part of the civilized
world. The Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to stand by the verdict

of history as to the impartiality and justice with which the accused will be
tried.
In conclusion it can be said that the trials in Nuernberg are
founded on sound law and represent the most encouraging sign in
the recent history of human relationship. It will now become impossible for an individual, who has power thrust upon him by the
force of historical circumstance, to escape punishment for his international crimes merely because of their enormity.
LAwRENcE LAUER.
26

The Permanent Court of International Justice in 1927 (S. S. Lotus)

France v. Turkey, 2 HUDSON WORLD COURT
27 Cited supra note 26.

REPORTS 23.

28 Glueck, By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be Tried (1943)
HARv. L. REv. 1059.
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